This paper proposes a new approach to identify robust joint actions for groups in conflict. It puts forward the concept of stable neighborhood positions or positions of local satiation. Positions of local satiation are positions of joint action where a small deviation of either of the belligerent groups from that arrangement does not increase one's benefit. The paper seeks to support its argument in two ways. First, it gives a descriptive foundation extracted from prospect theory for the concept of positions of local satiation. Especially the concept of myopic loss aversion that embraces narrow framing and local loss aversion is employed. Second, it tries to apply the concept of stable neighborhood positions in a case study. The case study unravels an investment conflict in the city of Brussels, Belgium.
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