References listed on IDEAS
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1. Svensson, Lars E.O., 1997. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," Seminar Papers 615, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Svensson, L-E-O, 1996. "Inflation Forecast Targeting : Implementaing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," Papers 615, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   • Svensson, Lars E O, 1996. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," CEPR Discussion Papers 1511, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Lars E. O. Svensson, 1997. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," NBER Working Papers 5797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Lars E O Svensson, . "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," Bank of England working papers 56, Bank of England.
   • Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997. "Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1111-1146, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "The Contributions Of The Economics Of Information To Twentieth Century Economics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1441-1478, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-97, May.
   Other versions:
   • Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Papers 636, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   • Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," CEPR Discussion Papers 1852, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Jon Faust & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," NBER Working Papers 6452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Svensson, Lars E.O. & Faust, John, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Seminar Papers 636, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
   • Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals," International Finance Discussion Papers 605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
4. Bernanke, Ben S & Woodford, Michael, 1997. "Inflation Forecasts and Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 653-84, November.
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   • Ben S. Bernanke & Michael Woodford, 1997. "Inflation Forecasts and Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 6157, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Ben S. Bernanke & Michael Woodford, 1997. "Inflation forecasts and monetary policy," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 653-686.
5. Tarkka , Juha & Mayes, David, 1999. "The Value of Publishing Official Central Bank Forecasts," Research Discussion Papers 22/1999, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
6. Alex Cukierman, 2002. "Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 15-36. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Cukierman, Alex, 2001. "Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent about Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does it Make?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,05, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
7. Walsh, Carl E, 1999. "Announcements, Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Incentives," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 66(262), pages 255-69, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is bank supervision central to central banking?," Working Papers 99-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
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   • Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is Bank Supervision Central To Central Banking?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 2000. "Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 429-457, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, . "Does it pay to be transparent? International evidence from central bank forecasts," Bank of England working papers 143, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2002. "Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 99-118. [Downloadable!]
12. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Oh, Seonghwan, 1995. "When and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 341-357, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "When and how much to talk: credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information," Working Papers 1990-004, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
    • Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "When and How Much to Talk: Credibility and Flexibility in Monetary Policy With Private Information," UCLA Economics Working Papers 593, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
13. Jensen, Henrik, 2002. " Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 104(3), pages 399-422, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Robert J. Barro, 1986. "Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers 1794, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Barro, Robert J., 1986. "Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 3-20, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1986. "Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-92, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Marvin Goodfriend, 1985. "Monetary mystique : secrecy and central banking," Working Paper 85-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
17. Geraats, Petra M, 2000. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," CEPR Discussion Papers 2582, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Petra M. Geraats, 2001. "Why adopt transparency? The publication of central bank forecasts," Working Paper Series 41, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    • Petra M. Geraats, 2001. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Macroeconomics 0012011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    • Petra Geraats, 2006. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series 1009, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    • Geraats, P.M., 2001. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Papers 41, Quebec a Montreal - Recherche en gestion.
18. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-38, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • David Backus & John Driffill, 1984. "Inflation and Reputation," Working Papers 560, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
20. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Geraats, P.M., 2005. "Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0557, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Petra Geraats, 2007. "Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
2. Gosselin, Pierre & Lotz, Aileen & Wyplosz, Charles, 2007. "Interest Rate Signals and Central Bank Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 6454, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Pierre Gosselin, Aileen Lotz and Charles Wyplosz, 2007. "Interest Rate Signals and Central Bank Transparency," HEI Working Papers 19-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised Aug 2007. [Downloadable!]
3. Geraats, P.M, 2005. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0549, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Petra Geraats, 2005. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
   • Petra M. Geraats, 2006. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," CESifo Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(1), pages 111-152, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Glenn D. Rudebusch & John C. Williams, 2006. "Revealing the Secrets of the Temple: The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections," NBER Working Papers 12638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Glenn D. Rudebusch & John C. Williams, 2006. "Revealing the secrets of the temple: the value of publishing central bank interest rate projections," Working Paper Series 2006-31, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
5. Menno Middeldorp & Clemens Kool & Stephanie Rosenkranz, 2007. "Listening Without Understanding," Working Papers 07-19, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Geraats, P.M., 2005. "The Mystique of Central Bank Speak," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0543, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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   • Petra Geraats, 2006. "The Mystique of Central Bank Speak," Working Papers 123, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank). [Downloadable!]
   • Petra M. Geraats, 2007. "The Mystique of Central Bank Speak," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 37-80, March. [Downloadable!]
7. Gosselin, Pierre & Gosselin-Lotz, Aileen & Wyplosz, Charles, 2006. "How Much Information Should Interest Rate-Setting Central Banks Reveal?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5666, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Pierre Gosselin & Aileen Lotz & Charles Wyplosz, 2006. "How Much Information should Interest Rate-Setting Central Banks Reveal?," HEI Working Papers 08-2006, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies. [Downloadable!]
8. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & van der Cruijsen, Carin A B, 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Cruijsen, C. van der & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Carin van der Cruijsen & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2007. "The economic impact of central bank transparency: a survey," DNB Working Papers 132, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
9. Phillip Lawler & Jonathan James, 2005. "Macroeconomic Shocks and Central Bank Disclosure Policy: Is increased Transparency Necessarily Beneficial?," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 27, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]