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Adverse Selection in Retiree Prescription Drug Plans

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Author Info
Dana Goldman (RAND)
Geoffrey Joyce (RAND)
Pinar Karaca-Mandic (RAND Corporation)
Neeraj Sood (RAND Corporation)

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Abstract

We used claims data from a large U.S. employer that introduced changes in its medical and drug coverage offerings in 2002 for non-Medicare eligible retirees. In addition to the existing plans, the employer introduced two new plans in 2002 that were less generous both in terms of medical and drug coverage. Further, one of the new plans had an annual benefit limit of $2,500 on prescription drugs, similar to the "doughnut hole" in the standard Medicare Part D benefit. We examined beneficiaries switching behavior in response to the new choice set and estimated the independent effects of medical and drug benefits on plan selection. We found that beneficiaries in better health were more likely to switch to the new, less generous plans. While the generosity of the medical benefit played a more important role in choosing a plan, choices did not vary significantly by health status. In contrast, sicker individuals were more likely to enroll in plans with generous drug benefits. This suggests that drug coverage may be more susceptible to adverse selection than medical insurance.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Forum for Health Economics & Policy.

Volume (Year): 9 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1062-1062
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Handle: RePEc:bep:fhecpo:v:9:y:2006:i:1:p:1062-1062

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Related research
Keywords: adverse selection prescription drugs insurance benefit design

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Ettner, Susan L., 1997. "Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap insurance by the elderly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 543-562, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  3. Bridgitte C. Madrian, 1994. "The Effect of Health Insurance on Retirement," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 25(1994-1), pages 181-152. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-19.


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