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Health Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage: Is Something Better Than Nothing?

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Author Info
Sherry Glied (Columbia University and NBER)
Abstract

Prior research on health insurance expansions has ignored the content of coverage, yet the nature of coverage offered is likely to affect both take-up by the uninsured and the public policy - relevant consequences of the expansion. This paper uses the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, the Survey of Program Dynamics, and the Rand Health Insurance Experiment to show that uninsured people are likely to value certain types of coverage more than others. Using a simulation model of the value of coverage expansions, I show that front-end coverage with a low-benefit maximum is likely to be perceived as more valuable than catastrophic coverage by low-income uninsured people. Some high-deductible coverage may make uninsured people subjectively worse off.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Forum for Health Economics & Policy.

Volume (Year): 6 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1046-1046
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Handle: RePEc:bep:fhecpo:v:6:y:2003:i:1:p:1046-1046

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Rask, Kevin N. & Rask, Kimberly J., 2000. "Public insurance substituting for private insurance: new evidence regarding public hospitals, uncompensated care funds, and medicaid," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-31, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 1996. "Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 609-639, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Wang, Hung-Jen & White, Michelle J, 2000. "An Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Procedure and Proposed Reforms," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 255-86, January.
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  4. Gropp, Reint & Scholz, John Karl & White, Michelle J, 1997. "Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 217-51, February.
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  5. Royalty, Anne Beeson, 2000. "Tax preferences for fringe benefits and workers' eligibility for employer health insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 209-227, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Nyman, John A., 2001. "The income transfer effect, the access value of insurance and the Rand health insurance experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 295-298, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Amy Finkelstein, 2002. "Minimum Standards and Insurance Regulation: Evidence from the Medigap Market," NBER Working Papers 8917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Cutler, David M & Gruber, Jonathan, 1996. "Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 391-430, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Zabinski, Daniel & Selden, Thomas M. & Moeller, John F. & Banthin, Jessica S., 1999. "Medical savings accounts: microsimulation results from a model with adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 195-218, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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