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Resource Allocation with Spatial Externalities: Experiments on Land Consolidation

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Author Info
Tomomi Tanaka (California Institute of Technology)

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Abstract

This paper compares the performance of a two-sided combinatorial call market, direct negotiation, and double auction for consolidating fragmented land. Experimental results suggest direct negotiation produces higher efficiencies than other mechanisms. The combinatorial call market tends to alleviate the exposure problem, and performs well when 1) swapping is easily agreeable, and 2) the number of subjects and commodities are increased and the initial endowments are unchallenging. The two-sided combinatorial call market, however, suffers from the holdout problem when the number of subjects and commodities is small.

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File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1622&context=bejeap
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy.

Volume (Year): 7 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1622-1622
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Handle: RePEc:bep:eaptop:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1622-1622

Note: oai:bepress:bejeap-1622
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Related research
Keywords: mechanism design two-sided combinatorial auction holdout

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Lerman, Zvi & Csaki, Csaba & Feder, Gershon, 2002. "Land policies and evolving farm structures in transition countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2794, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1997. "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 497-527, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & John Williams, 1998. "Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," Papers of Peter Cramton 98jleer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 12 Jul 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Jabarin, Amer S. & Epplin, Francis M., 1994. "Impacts of land fragmentation on the cost of producing wheat in the rain-fed region of northern Jordan," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 11(2-3), pages 191-196, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Game theory and the spectrum auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 771-778, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Heston, Alan & Kumar, Dharma, 1983. "The persistence of land fragmentation in peasant agriculture: An analysis of South Asian cases," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 199-220, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Monke, Eric & Avillez, Francisco & Ferro, Manuela, 1992. "Consolidation Policies and Small-Farm Agriculture in Northwest Portugal," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press for the Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 19(1), pages 67-83.
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  10. Plott, Charles R & Smith, Vernon L, 1978. "An Experimental Examination of Two Exchange Institutions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(1), pages 133-53, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Cramton, Peter, 1998. "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 727-36, October.
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  12. Banks, Jeffrey & Olson, Mark & Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Smith, Vernon, 2003. "Theory, experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 303-350, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Wan, Guang H & Cheng, Enjiang, 2001. "Effects of Land Fragmentation and Returns to Scale in the Chinese Farming Sector," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 33(2), pages 183-94, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. John O. Ledyard & David Porter & Antonio Rangel, 1997. "Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 639-675, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Bykowsky, Mark M & Cull, Robert J & Ledyard, John O, 2000. "Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 205-28, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Paul Milgrom, 2000. "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 245-272, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Bossaerts, Peter & Fine, Leslie & Ledyard, John, 2002. "Inducing liquidity in thin financial markets through combined-value trading mechanisms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1671-1695, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Parkhurst, Gregory M. & Shogren, Jason F. & Bastian, Chris & Kivi, Paul & Donner, Jennifer & Smith, Rodney B. W., 2002. "Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 305-328, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kurtis Swope, Pamela Schmitt, John Cadigan and Robert Shupp, 2008. "An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game," Departmental Working Papers 21, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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