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The Evolution of Open Source Communities

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Author Info
Joerg Gutsche (University of Mannheim)

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Abstract

A growing body of literature has succeeded in explaining the economics of existing open source communities. However, the question why such communities come into existence has so far not been answered satisfactorily. This paper addresses this question with an evolutionary model: software developers repeatedly decide whether to use an open source or a proprietary license using boundedly rational decision rules. We analyze the resulting stochastic process and provide conditions under which open source licensing is the only long-run outcome that is stable to perturbations. It turns out that these conditions coincide with important stylized facts about thriving open source communities.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy.

Volume (Year): 5 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1359-1359
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Handle: RePEc:bep:eaptop:v:5:y:2005:i:1:p:1359-1359

Note: oai:bepress:bejeap-1359
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Related research
Keywords: Open source software Public goods Cooperation Imitation Stochastic stability

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Justin Pappas Johnson, 2002. "Open Source Software: Private Provision of a Public Good," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(4), pages 637-662, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John Duffy & Nick Feltovich, 1997. "Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 592, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly--An Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C80-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Pingle, Mark & Day, Richard H., 1996. "Modes of economizing behavior: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 191-209, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ted Bergstrom & Oded Stark, 1993. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1993B, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "The open source movement: Key research questions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 819-826, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. van Damme, Eric & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2002. "Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 296-315, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Jürgen Bitzer & Philipp J. H. Schröder, 2002. "Bug-Fixing and Code-Writing : The Private Provision of Open Source Software," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 296, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Frank A.G. den Butter & Stefan P.T. Groot & Faroek Lazrak, 2007. "The Transaction Costs Perspective on Standards as a Source of Trade and Productivity Growth," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-090/3, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-15.

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