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Rational or Confused Polluters? Evidence from Hazardous Waste Compliance

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Author Info
Sarah Stafford (College of William and Mary)
Abstract

Although most models of environmental compliance are based on a variation of the rational polluter model, regulated entities may not always intentionally decide to violate based on the relative costs and benefits of doing so. According to the complexity critique, a significant amount of noncompliance may be the result of ignorance about the requirements of the law. Using hazardous waste regulations as a case study, this paper examines the role that rationality and complexity play in environmental compliance. The results suggest that both are necessary to explain hazardous waste compliance behavior. In support of the rational polluter model, the results show that factors which increase the cost of compliance also increase the likelihood of a violation while factors that increase the likelihood of inspections and detection decrease the probability of a violation. In support of the complexity critique, the results show that larger facilities and facilities of multi-plant companies are less likely to violate, while facilities that are subject to more complex regulations are more likely to violate. Also in support of the complexity critique, facilities learn from past inspections and facilities in states with programs directed toward reducing complexity are less likely to violate. This mixed support holds across various subgroup of facilities, although there does appear to be some difference in the factors that contribute to different types of violations. In particular, non-management violations appear to be driven less by a rational comparison of the costs and benefits of violations than by the complexity of regulations.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy.

Volume (Year): 5 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1623-1623
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Handle: RePEc:bep:eapcon:v:5:y:2006:i:1:p:1623-1623

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Related research
Keywords: corporate environmental behavior compliance enforcement hazardous waste rational polluter complexity critique

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Laplante, Benoit & Rilstone, Paul, 1996. "Environmental Inspections and Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 19-36, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Innes, Robert, 1999. "Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-393, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Shimshack, Jay P. & Ward, Michael B., 2005. "Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 519-540, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stafford, Sarah L., 2002. "The Effect of Punishment on Firm Compliance with Hazardous Waste Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 290-308, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. William H. Greene, 1992. "A Statistical Model for Credit Scoring," Working Papers 92-29, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Heyes, Anthony, 2000. "Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 107-29, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kaplow, Louis, 1995. "A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 150-63, April.
  9. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Poirier, Dale J., 1980. "Partial observability in bivariate probit models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 209-217, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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