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Moral Federalism

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Author Info
Eckhard Janeba (University of Mannheim)
Abstract

Many political issues like abortion, gay marriage or assisted suicide are strongly contested because individuals have preferences not only over their own choice but also about other individuals' actions. The paper models and compares the equilibria of three institutional regimes (ranging from centralized to decentralized decision making) in an economy where individuals choose their residence and vote over a single-dimensional regulatory policy at the regional and national level. Moral federalism describes a phenomenon where the majority of people who favor a restrictive policy try to impose their preferences through the federal government on jurisdictions where permissive policies are favored. The majority group's gain is larger, the smaller it is in size relative to the entire population. At the normative level, the outcome under centralized and decentralized decision making is the worst when societies are polarized. Allowing the federal government to restrict regional choices is never optimal.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy.

Volume (Year): 5 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1558-1558
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Handle: RePEc:bep:eapcon:v:5:y:2006:i:1:p:1558-1558

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Related research
Keywords: federalism decentralization Tiebout equilibrium externality morals

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. CRÉMER, Jacques & PALFREY, Thomas, 2003. "A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities," IDEI Working Papers 182, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Black, Dan & Gates, Gary & Sanders, Seth & Taylor, Lowell, 2002. "Why Do Gay Men Live in San Francisco?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 54-76, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Jacques Cremer & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Federal Mandates by Popular Demand," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 905-927, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Sen, Amartya K, 1976. "Liberty, Unanimity and Rights," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(171), pages 217-45, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Robert Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1997. "Rethinking Federalism," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1140, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Epple, Dennis & Romer, Thomas, 1991. "Mobility and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 828-58, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Inman, Robert P & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1997. "Rethinking Federalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 43-64, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & Caroline Hoxby, 2004. "Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 348-396, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1981. "Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(1), pages 152-65, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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