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Managed Care and Physician Incentives: The Effects of Competition on the Cost and Quality of Care

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Author Info
David Cooper (Case Western Reserve University)
James Rebitzer (Case Western Reserve University)

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Abstract

We analyze the effect that competition between HMOs has on the cost and quality of medical services. Our key result is that increasing competition enhances consumer utility while also moderating the impact of managed care on quality and costs. Indeed, we find that heightened competition between HMOs can cause an overall increase in care quality and costs. This result derives from an important, but overlooked, feature of the managed care market place. Plans differentiate themselves by the size and depth of their provider network. The resulting competition to attract physicians exerts a moderating effect on the incentive contracts HMOs write with providers.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy.

Volume (Year): 5 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1409-1409
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Handle: RePEc:bep:eapcon:v:5:y:2006:i:1:p:1409-1409

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Related research
Keywords: managed care physician incentives product differentiation norms

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Phelps, Charles E, 1992. "Diffusion of Information in Medical Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 23-42, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ching-To Albert Ma & Thomas G. Mcguire, 2002. "Network Incentives in Managed Health Care," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(1), pages 1-35, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Kessler, Daniel & McClellan, Mark, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 353-90, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Martin Gaynor, James B. Rebitzer, and Lowell J. Taylor, 2004. "Physician Incentives in Health Maintenance Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 915-931, August.
  5. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics And Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Altman, Daniel & Cutler, David & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2003. "Enrollee mix, treatment intensity, and cost in competing indemnity and HMO plans," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 23-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Duggan, Mark, 2004. "Does contracting out increase the efficiency of government programs? Evidence from Medicaid HMOs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2549-2572, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," NBER Working Papers 5466, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-17, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "Differentiated industries without entry barriers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 310-339, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Biglaiser, Gary & Ma, Ching-to Albert, 2003. " Price and Quality Competition under Adverse Selection: Market Organization and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 266-86, Summer.
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