This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Selective Enforcement of Copyright as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Danny Ben-Shahar (The Interdisciplinary Center)
Assaf Jacob (IDC)
Abstract

We present a perfect Nash equilibrium in which the creator of a work, motivated by economic considerations, selectively enforces her own copyright. In fact, the creator may not only permit, but may strategically promote infringement of the copyright, thereby participating indirectly in predatory pricing, and so raising barriers to entry. Our model is highly applicable to the software industry, where relatively high entry costs and the relatively low cost of copyright infringement make this phenomenon likely. We further show the conditions under which exogenous intervention, through intensive enforcement of copyrights, increases social welfare. Finally, we explore some potential strategies for such legal intervention.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1189&context=bejeap
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Subscription to the journal may be required to access full texts.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy.

Volume (Year): 3 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1189-1189
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bep:eapcon:v:3:y:2004:i:1:p:1189-1189

Note: oai:bepress:bejeap-1189
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.bepress.com/subscriptions.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Antitrust Copyright Predatory Pricing Monopoly Microsoft Nash Equilibrium Price Discrimination

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Liebowitz, S J, 1985. "Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 945-57, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. William D. Nordhaus, 1969. "An Economic Theory of Technological Change," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 265, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ordover, Janusz A & Willig, Robert D, 1978. "On the Optimal Provision of Journals qua Sometimes Shared Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(3), pages 324-38, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Michael Waldman, 1991. "The Role of Multiple Potential Entrants/Sequential Entry in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 446-453, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1989. "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 325-63, June.
  6. Takeyama, Lisa N, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 155-66, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Besen, Stanley M., 1986. "Private copying, reproduction costs, and the supply of intellectual property," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 5-22. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Johnson, William R, 1985. "The Economics of Copying," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(1), pages 158-74, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Novos, Ian E & Waldman, Michael, 1984. "The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(2), pages 236-46, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kai-Lung Hui & Ivan Png, 2003. "Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded Music," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1160-1160. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Nordhaus, William D, 1969. "An Economic Theory of Technological Change," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 18-28, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc data is maintained by each archive holder on its own website. Nothing is held centrally.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-15.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.