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Energy Taxes in Three Political Economy Models

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Author Info
Helmuth Cremer (Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ, IDEI and Institut universitaire de France))
Philippe De Donder (Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ-CNRS and IDEI))
Firouz Gahvari (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

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Abstract

What accounts for the existence of positive energy taxes in the US, given that such taxes are regressive and that the income distribution is skewed to the right? The traditional majority-voting equilibrium approach suggests a subsidy; thus we also look at two alternatives. These are the probabilistic-voting model and Roemer's (2001) model of political competition with the "Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium" (PUNE) as the equilibrium solution concept. Our economic model is calibrated on the basis of the US data. The paper shows that while the majority-voting approach calls for a massive subsidy, the PUNE approach leads to huge environmental taxes. Our tentative results suggest that the probabilistic model, wherein parties assume that the proportion of unbiased voters is the same in all categories of income, comes closest to explaining the observed US energy taxes.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy.

Volume (Year): 7 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1707-1707
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Related research
Keywords: energy taxes political competition majority-voting probabilistic voting PUNE

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Gately, D. & Huntington, H.G., 2001. "The Asymmetric Effects of Changes in Price and Income on Energy and Oil Demand," Working Papers 01-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Helmuth Cremer & Philippe De Donder & Firouz Gahvari, 2004. "Political Sustainability and the Design of Environmental Taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(6), pages 703-719, November. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. James M. Poterba, 1991. "Tax Policy to Combat Global Warming: On Designing a Carbon Tax," NBER Working Papers 3649, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe & Gahvari, Firouz, 2005. "Political competition within and between parties: an application to environmental policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 5228, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Helmuth Cremer & Philippe De Donder & Firouz Gahvari, 2004. "Taxes, Budgetary Rule and Majority Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 335-358, 06. [Downloadable!]
  6. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "The elusive median voter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 143-170, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-15.


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