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Regulatory Incentives and Consolidation: The Case of Commercial Bank Mergers and the Community Reinvestment Act

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Author Info
Raphael Bostic (School of Policy, Planning and Development, University of Southern California)
Anna Paulson (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)
Hamid Mehran (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
Marc Saidenberg (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

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Abstract

Bank regulators are required to consider a bank's record of providing credit to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods and individuals in approving bank applications for mergers and acquisitions. We provide evidence that banks self-regulate by strategically increasing their lending to these populations prior to acquiring another institution in anticipation of the regulatory and public scrutiny associated with a merger or acquisition. In particular, we show that the higher the percentage of the institution's mortgage originations in a given year that are directed to low- and moderate-income individuals or neighborhoods, the greater the probability that the institution will acquire another bank in the following year. Further investigation bolsters the view that this correlation is due to banks' anticipation of the public and regulatory scrutiny during the merger review process: (1) the effect cannot be explained by regulator behavior or by unobserved bank characteristics; (2) the relationship is observed for acquiring banks, which are the primary focus of scrutiny, but not for the banks that are being acquired; (3) the positive effect increases over the 1991 to 1995 time frame, a period when scrutiny of an institution's community lending record increased; and (4) the effect is largest for big banks, who face particularly intense scrutiny.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy.

Volume (Year): 5 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1392-1392
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Handle: RePEc:bep:eapadv:v:5:y:2005:i:1:p:1392-1392

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Related research
Keywords: bank merger self-regulation community reinvestment regulatory threat

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Anthony W. Cyrnak, 1998. "Bank merger policy and the new CRA data," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Sep, pages 703-715. [Downloadable!]
  2. Robert B. Avery & Raphael W. Bostic & Paul S. Calem & Glenn B. Canner, 1999. "Trends in home purchase lending: consolidation and the Community Reinvestment Act," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Feb, pages 81-102. [Downloadable!]
  3. Robert B. Avery & Patricia E. Beeson & Mark S. Sniderman, 1997. "Information dynamics and CRA strategy," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Feb 1. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stango, Victor, 2003. "Strategic Responses to Regulatory Threat in the Credit Card Market," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 427-52, October.
    Other versions:
  5. Glenn Canner & Wayne Passmore, 1997. "The Community Reinvestment Act and the profitability of mortgage-oriented banks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-7, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  6. Glenn B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, 1991. "Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: expanded data on residential lending," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Nov, pages 859-881.
  7. Christopher P. Beshouri & Dennis C. Glennon, 1996. "CRA as "market development" or "tax": an analysis of lending decisions and economic development," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 556-585.
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