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Banking Crisis vs. Credit Crunch? A Cross-Country Comparison of Policy Responses to Dilemmas in Banking Regulation

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Author Info
Thomas Bernauer (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)
Vally Koubi (ETHZ and University of Bern, Switzerland)
Abstract

Restrictive policies aimed at reducing the likelihood of bank failure during recessions tend to increase the probability of a credit crunch. In this paper we infer governments' policy responses to this dilemma by studying the cyclical behavior of bank capital in 1369 banks from 28 OECD countries during the period 1992-98. We find significant differences across countries. In the US and Japan, bank capital is counter-cyclical, that is, the typical bank strengthens its capital base during periods of weak economic activity. In the other countries, there is no relationship between the level of macroeconomic activity and bank capital. From these findings we infer that severe banking crises in the US and Japan may have made policymakers there more vigilant towards "unhealthy" banks, even when this implies an increase in the risk of a credit crunch. In countries without such crisis experience, policymakers seem to be less concerned about future banking crises. Our results suggest that the strong push by the US for the 1988 Basle Accord may have been a reflection of this increased sensitivity. They also suggest that, to the extent business cycles do not develop in synchronicity across countries and policymakers respond differently to the banking crisis-credit crunch dilemma, current reforms of the Basle Accord, which are designed to tighten regulatory requirements, may encounter difficulties.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Business and Politics.

Volume (Year): 6 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 1091-1091
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Handle: RePEc:bep:buspol:6:2004:2:1091-1091

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Related research
Keywords: Regulation Bank Capital Credit Crunch Banking Crisis Recession Basle Accord

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995. "Bank regulation and the credit crunch," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 679-692, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr. & R.W. Hafer, 2001. "Bank failures in banking panics: Risky banks or road kill?," Working Paper 2001-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
  3. João A. C. Santos, 2000. "Bank capital regulation in contemporary banking theory: a review of the literature," BIS Working Papers 90, Bank for International Settlements. [Downloadable!]
  4. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Joseph G. Haubrich & Paul Wachtel, 1993. "Capital requirements and shifts in commercial bank portfolios," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q III, pages 2-15. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ben S. Bernanke & Cara S. Lown, 1991. "The Credit Crunch," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 22(1991-2), pages 205-248. [Downloadable!]
  7. Chiuri, Maria Concetta & Ferri, Giovanni & Majnoni, Giovanni, 2001. "The macroeconomic impact of bank capital requirements in emerging economies - past evidence to assess the future," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2605, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Burnside, Craig & Eichenbaum, Martin & Rebelo, Sergio, 2001. "Hedging and financial fragility in fixed exchange rate regimes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(7), pages 1151-1193. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Frederick T. Furlong, 1992. "Capital regulation and bank lending," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 23-33. [Downloadable!]
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