This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Bargains Old and New: Multinational Corporations in Global Governance

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
David Levy (University of Massachusetts, Boston)
Aseem Prakash (University of Washington-Seattle)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper outlines an approach for understanding the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in global governance. We develop a typology of regime types with two dimensions, the goal of the regime, which can be market enabling or regulatory, and the location of authority, which can be national, regional, or international, with public and private elements. MNCs tend to support the creation of market enabling regimes at the international level, and prefer to keep social or environmental regulation under national or private authority. However, these are only generalizations and MNCs develop preferences based on their relative influence in various arenas, the costs of political participation, and competitive considerations. We argue that institutions of global governance represent the outcome of a series of negotiations among corporations, states, and non-state actors. The preferences and power of MNCs vary across issues and sectors, and from one negotiating forum to another, accounting for the uneven and fragmented nature of the resulting system. Our approach differs from the traditional FDI bargaining framework in that it recognizes the multi-party nature of negotiations and multiple sources of power. Moreover, the complexity and dynamic nature of the process results in a somewhat indeterminate process.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=bap
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Subscription to the journal may be required to access full texts.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Business and Politics.

Volume (Year): 5 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 1051-1051
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bep:buspol:5:2003:2:1051-1051

Note: oai:bepress:bap-1051
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.bepress.com/bap/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.bepress.com/subscriptions.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Haas, Peter M, 1992. "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 46(1), pages 187-224, Winter.
  2. Andrew m. Mclaughlin & GRANT JORDAN & WILLIAM A. MALONEY, 1993. "Corporate Lobbying in the European Community," Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(2), pages 191-212, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kobrin, Stephen J, 1987. "Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in Developing Countries," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 41(4), pages 609-38, Autumn.
  4. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Haggard, Stephen & Simmons, Beth A, 1987. "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 41(3), pages 491-517, Summer.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. John Mikler, 2007. "Varieties of Capitalism and the Auto Industry's Environmental Initiatives: National Institutional Explanations for Firms' Motivations," Business and Politics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 9(1), pages 1166-1166. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Thomas Lawton & Steven McGuire, 2005. "Adjusting to Liberalization: Tracing the Impact of the WTO on the European Textiles and Chemicals Industries," Business and Politics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(2), pages 1097-1097. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Libman, Alexander, 2007. "Institutional competition in the post-Soviet space," MPRA Paper 10936, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hans-Jürgen Bieling, 2008. "The Other Side of the Coin: Conceptualizing the Relationship between Business and the State in the Age of Globalisation," Business and Politics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 9(3), pages 1187-1187. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS is not the only service displaying RePEc data. Choose on RePEc which service fits your needs best.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-25.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.