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Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective

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Author Info
Jeffrey Milyo
David Primo
Timothy Groseclose

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Abstract

There is a vast empirical literature on the allocation of corporate PAC contributions in Congressional elections and the influence that these contributions have on the policy-making process. The attention given to PAC contributions is far in excess of their actual importance. Corporate PAC contributions account for about 10% of Congressional campaign spending and major corporations allocate far more money to lobbying or philanthropy than their affiliated PACs make in contributions.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Business and Politics.

Volume (Year): 2 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 75-88
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Handle: RePEc:bep:buspol:2:2000:1:75-88

Note: oai:bepress:bap-1004
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jeffrey Milyo, 1998. "What do Candidates Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)?," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9822, Department of Economics, Tufts University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Stephen D. Levitt, 1998. "Are PACs Trying to Influence Politicians or Voters?," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 19-35, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.
  5. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1982. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(1), pages 77-83, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jeffrey Milyo, 1997. "The economics of political campaign finance: FECA and the puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 245-270, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
  8. Stratmann, Thomas, 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(1), pages 127-36, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, 2002. "Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 9064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. John M. de Figueiredo & Charles M. Cameron, 2006. "Endogenous Cost Lobbying: Theory and Evidence," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d05-156, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  3. David Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, 2004. "State Campaign Finance Laws and the Turnout Decision," Working Papers 0410, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jeffrey Milyo, 2002. "Bribes and Fruit Baskets: What Does the Link Between PAC Contributions and Lobbying Mean?," Business and Politics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(2), pages 157-159. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. John M. de Figueiredo, 2002. "Lobbying and Information in Politics," Business and Politics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(2), pages 125-129. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Giovanni Facchini & Anna Maria Mayda & Prachi Mishra, 2007. "Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration?," IZA Discussion Papers 3183, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  7. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2007. "Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress," NBER Working Papers 13672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. John Wright, 2004. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting on Tobacco Policy, 1980-2000," Business and Politics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(3), pages 1066-1066. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ansolabehere, Stephen & De Figueiredo, John M. & Snyder, James M., 2003. "Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?"," Working papers 4272-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  10. Prachi Mishra & Anna Maria Mayda & Giovanni Facchini, 2008. "Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy?," IMF Working Papers 08/244, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Cotton, Christopher, 2007. "Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access," MPRA Paper 1842, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-25.


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