This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Jeffrey Milyo
David Primo
Timothy Groseclose
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
There is a vast empirical literature on the allocation of corporate PAC contributions in Congressional elections and the influence that these contributions have on the policy-making process. The attention given to PAC contributions is far in excess of their actual importance. Corporate PAC contributions account for about 10% of Congressional campaign spending and major corporations allocate far more money to lobbying or philanthropy than their affiliated PACs make in contributions.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Business and Politics .
Volume (Year): 2 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 75-88
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML ,
plain text ,
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bep:buspol:2:2000:1:75-88Note: oai:bepress:bap-1004Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.bepress.com/bap/
Order Information: Web: http://www.bepress.com/subscriptions.html
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Jeffrey Milyo, 1998.
"What do Candidates Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)? ,"
Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University
9822, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998.
"Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1998.
"Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees ,"
CRSP working papers
349, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1996.
"Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress:Theory And Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees ,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
126, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
[Downloadable!] Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, .
"Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services', Political Action Committees ,"
CRSP working papers
465, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
Stephen D. Levitt, 1998.
"Are PACs Trying to Influence Politicians or Voters? ,"
Economics and Politics ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 19-35, 03.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991.
"Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions ,"
Economic Inquiry ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.
Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1982.
"Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model ,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics ,
MIT Press, vol. 64(1), pages 77-83, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jeffrey Milyo, 1997.
"The economics of political campaign finance: FECA and the puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 245-270, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Stratmann, Thomas, 1998.
"The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything? ,"
Journal of Law & Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
Stratmann, Thomas, 1995.
"Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter? ,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics ,
MIT Press, vol. 77(1), pages 127-36, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, 2002.
"Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying ,"
NBER Working Papers
9064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: John M. de Figueiredo & Charles M. Cameron, 2006.
"Endogenous Cost Lobbying: Theory and Evidence ,"
Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
d05-156, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
[Downloadable!]
David Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, 2004.
"State Campaign Finance Laws and the Turnout Decision ,"
Working Papers
0410, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
[Downloadable!]
Jeffrey Milyo, 2002.
"Bribes and Fruit Baskets: What Does the Link Between PAC Contributions and Lobbying Mean? ,"
Business and Politics ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(2), pages 157-159.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
John M. de Figueiredo, 2002.
"Lobbying and Information in Politics ,"
Business and Politics ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(2), pages 125-129.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Giovanni Facchini & Anna Maria Mayda & Prachi Mishra, 2007.
"Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration? ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3183, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2007.
"Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress ,"
NBER Working Papers
13672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: John Wright, 2004.
"Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting on Tobacco Policy, 1980-2000 ,"
Business and Politics ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(3), pages 1066-1066.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ansolabehere, Stephen & De Figueiredo, John M. & Snyder, James M., 2003.
"Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?" ,"
Working papers
4272-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
[Downloadable!]
Prachi Mishra & Anna Maria Mayda & Giovanni Facchini, 2008.
"Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy? ,"
IMF Working Papers
08/244, International Monetary Fund.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Cotton, Christopher, 2007.
"Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access ,"
MPRA Paper
1842, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? IDEAS is also providing many rankings , for example of authors and institutions.
This page was last updated on 2008-11-25.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .