This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Agricultural Marketing Institutions: A Response to Quality Disputes

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Carolyn Dimitri (USDA-ERS, Washington DC, USA)
Abstract

Grades and inspections govern the marketing of agricultural commodities. Federal legislation created the marketing institutions, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when national markets were emerging. Three commodities - fresh produce (fruit and vegetables), grains, and meat - all rely on similar institutions, suggesting they serve a similar role in each market. Tracing the events prior to the legislation of inspection for the three product groups reveals that disputes over quality in transactions between buyers and sellers were present in the fruit and vegetable and grain markets, while transactions along the meat marketing chain were not subject to such disputes. Evidence suggests that the institutions performed the same functions in the fruit and vegetable and grain sectors (solve quality problems), while meat inspections served different purposes that varied over time. As contracts and vertically coordinated market channels become more common in the fresh produce and grain industries, reputation effects will likely be able to enforce contracts, reducing the need for inspection. Meat inspection most likely will continue to be required to ensure sanitation and safety of the meat supply.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=jafio
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Subscription to the journal may be required to access full texts.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 1 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1035-1035
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bep:bjafio:v:1:y:2003:i:1:p:1035-1035

Note: oai:bepress:jafio-1035
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.bepress.com/jafio/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.bepress.com/subscriptions.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: inspections marketing institutions quality enforcement certification institutional innovation

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Albano, Gian Luigi & Lizzeri, Alessandro, 2001. "Strategic Certification and Provision of Quality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(1), pages 267-83, February.
  2. De, Sankar & Nabar, Prafulla, 1991. "Economic implications of imperfect quality certification," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 333-337, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. William Hill, 1904. "Conditions in the Cattle Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13, pages 1. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mason, Charles F & Sterbenz, Frederic P, 1994. "Imperfect Product Testing and Market Size," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(1), pages 61-86, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kindleberger, Charles P, 1983. "Standards as Public, Collective and Private Goods," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 377-96.
  6. Leland, Hayne E, 1979. "Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1328-46, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Harvey E. Lapan & GianCarlo Moschini, 2004. "Identity Preservation and Labeling of Genetically Modified Products: System Design and Enforcement Issues," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 04-wp375, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Lapan, Harvey E. & Moschini, GianCarlo, 2006. "Grading, Minimum Quality Standards, and the Labeling of Genetically Modified Products," Staff General Research Papers 12553, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? It is the publishers that input data about their publications, as there is no staff at RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-19.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.