This paper discusses several competition issues that have emerged in the Latin American rail industry after the recent restructuring experiences started during the 1990s. The analysis focuses on Brazil and Mexico providing a brief account of the main characteristics of the concessioning process in each of these two countries. The relevant competition issues are then analyzed from a double perspective. First, it is shown that many of the most relevant conflicts can be traced back to the design of the concessioning contracts and the auctioning rules through which they were awarded. Secondly, other antitrust issues have arisen from the network nature of the rail industry and the fact that all countries opted by horizontal separation methods in their rail restructuring.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General
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Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1994.
"Access Pricing and Competition,"
Working papers
94-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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