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The Agency Theory Applied to the Investment Funds

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Author Info

  • Flavia Zoboli Dalmacio

    (FUCAPE - Capixaba Foundation for Research in Accounting, Economy and Finance)

  • Valcemiro Nossa

    (FUCAPE - Capixaba Foundation for Research in Accounting, Economy and Finance)

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    Abstract

    This article seeks to verify the existence of a relationship between the rate of remuneration charged by the administrators of investment funds and the profitability of these portfolios, under the perspective of the Agency Theory. The Agency Theory seeks to explain the conflicts of interest that can arise from the contractual relationship between a principal and an agent. The agent is the individual who, motivated by his own interests, undertakes to do certain tasks for the principal. This work was developed from a bibliographical review and, based on experimental research, empirical investigations were made, the principal object of which was the test of the hypothesis with relation to cause-effect that could exist between the administration tax and the profitability of the investment funds. However, the results obtained by means of the use of statistical tests did not sustain the hypothesis raised in this work.

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    File URL: http://www.bbronline.com.br/public/edicoes/1_1/artigos/8@r71i6526112010141155.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Fucape Business School in its journal Brazilian Business Review.

    Volume (Year): 1 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 31-44

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    Handle: RePEc:bbz:fcpbbr:v:1:y:2004:i:1:p:31-44

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    Postal: Fucape Business School Brazilian Business Review Av. Fernando Ferrari, 1358, Boa Vista CEP 29075-505 Vitória-ES
    Phone: +55 27 4009-4423
    Fax: +55 27 4009-4422
    Web page: http://www.bbronline.com.br/
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    Related research

    Keywords: agency theory; conflict of interests; investment funds;

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