The Capital-Centered Model of Corporate Ownership
AbstractThe article deals with the traditional model of corporate ownership, named “capital-centered”, which corresponds to the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance. The model is unfolded by reviewing the problems stemming from the separation of ownership and control in the corporate form in light of the main theoretical streams dealing with them, namely, 1) the transfer of control from owners to top managers highlighted by managerial theories; 2) conflicts between stakeholders and managers and their mitigation by the agency theory mechanisms for bringing the interests of the two groups, including the internal governance organs and external disciplining factors; and 3) raising firm efficiency by its managerial structure, internal organization, what transaction cost theory focuses upon. The traditional forms of control over a corporate enterprise are shown and in conclusion a summary of the model is made.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute in its journal Economic Thought.
Volume (Year): (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marris, Robin & Mueller, Dennis C, 1980. "The Corporation, Competition, and the Invisible Hand," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 32-63, March.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1981. "The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1537-68, December.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
- Yarrow, G K, 1976. "On the Predictions of Managerial Theories of the Firm," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 267-79, June.
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