Tax Corruption: Stimuli and Restraints
AbstractThis paper studies recent findings of business and tax administration surveys on the scope and causes of corruption in tax administration in Bulgaria in the context of the theoretical models and empirical tests of corruption and evasion. It is an attempt to shift the current policy focus on sanctions and brakes to positive incentives. It studies the specific demand and supply-side drivers of corruption for the two broad categories of corruption services supplied by the tax administration: those, related to tax evasion and those, related to preferential treatment of taxpayers. On these grounds it draws some policy implications on the opportunities and limitations of the use of incentives, especially wage and bonus incentives in the fight against corruption in tax administration.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute in its journal Economic Thought.
Volume (Year): (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- International Monetary Fund, 1997. "Corruption and the Rate of Temptation - Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?," IMF Working Papers 97/73, International Monetary Fund.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World - Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Working Papers 98/63, International Monetary Fund.
- Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(4), pages 559-594, December.
- Rauch, James E. & Evans, Peter B., 2000.
"Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 49-71, January.
- Rauch, James E & Evans, Peter B., 1999. "Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0sb0w38d, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vassil Zahariev).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.