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Public Choice Theory: Critical Analysis of the Process of Making Collective Fiscal Decisions

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  • Georgi Manliev
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    Abstract

    The paper presents the views of Buchanan on making collective fiscal decisions in conditions of simple majority, of the usefulness function of the politicians, bureaucrats and lobbies and the myopia in the behavior of the electors. He draws the conclusion that the fiscal decisions are ineffective, because they do not take into consideration the preferences of the electors. For overcoming this effect (defined by Arrow as theorem of impossibility of the society to reach effective collective decisions), Buchanan suggests introducing constitutional rights, which would make the public choice more effective. According to him, there are three different possible constitutions (on taxing, fiscal redistribution and money supply), or one Constitution, which includes tax, fiscal and monetary rules. To some or other degree, many countries have adopted fiscal and monetary rules in their Constitutions. After the crisis in 2008-2011, adopting fiscal rules is already considered an inevitable decision for achieving fiscal discipline and stability in the development of the different European countries and the Eurozone.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute in its journal Economic Studies.

    Volume (Year): (2013)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 143-174

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    Handle: RePEc:bas:econst:y:2013:i:1:p:143-174

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    1. Buchanan, James M., 1986. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1986-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    2. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
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