Corporate Governance and Capital Structure:Evidence from Taiwan SMEs
AbstractThis study examines the effects of corporate governance on capital structure, using the data of 145 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over the period 2000-2007. The results show that, when there is a high divergence between shareholdings and director seats, conventional industries prefer to use long-term debt financing, while high-tech industries prefer the opposite. For large firms, block-holders and independent directors prefer lower long-term debt financing, but family shareholders and managerial directors prefer lower short-term debt financing. We also find that family shareholding ratio and family directors are the two most important factors that affect the SMEs¡¯ debt ratio. The higher the family shareholding ratio is, the more short-term debt financing will be. However, family directors can reduce the incidence of using short-term debt to support long-term financial needs.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Better Advances Press, Canada in its journal Review of Economics & Finance.
Volume (Year): 2 (2012)
Issue (Month): (August)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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