The Political Economy of Public Debt
AbstractWe survey recent theories of public debt that incorporate political decision making in rich dynamic environments. These theories provide a new framework with which to interpret empirical evidence and to assess institutional reforms that may help control political inefficiencies. We discuss the inefficiencies that lead to overaccumulation of debt and their implications for the long-run distribution of debt.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Annual Reviews in its journal Annual Review of Economics.
Volume (Year): 3 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (09)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
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