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A Survey of Noncooperative Game Theory with Reference to Agricultural Markets: Part 2. Potential Applications in Agriculture

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  • Sexton, Richard J.
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    Abstract

    This paper is the second of a two-part survey on noncooperative game theory relevant to agricultural markets. Part 1 of the survey focused on important game theory concepts, while this paper illustrates applications of the theory to agricultural markets. Game theory is relevant when markets are imperfectly competitive, and this paper argues that this condition is commonly met in agriculture. Specific topics of application include principal-agent models, auctions, and bargaining.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society in its journal Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics.

    Volume (Year): 62 (1994)
    Issue (Month): 02 (August)
    Pages:

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    Handle: RePEc:ags:remaae:12484

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    Postal: AARES Central Office Manager, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU, Canberra ACT 0200
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    Keywords: Marketing;

    References

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    1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    2. Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
    3. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    4. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-39, December.
    6. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
    7. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-67, November.
    8. Greenhut,Melvin L. & Norman,George & Hung,Chao-Shun, 1987. "The Economics of Imperfect Competition," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521315647, April.
    9. A. M. Azzam & E. Pagoulatos, 1990. "Testing Oligopolistic And Oligopsonistic Behaviour: An Application To The Us Meat-Packing Industry," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 362-370.
    10. Evans, Robert, 1989. "Sequential Bargaining with Correlated Values," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 499-510, October.
    11. Innes, Robert & Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Customer coalitions, monopoly price discrimination and generic entry deterrence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1569-1597, December.
    12. Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-90, October.
    13. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
    14. Robert G. Hansen, 1988. "Auctions with Endogenous Quantity," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 44-58, Spring.
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    Cited by:
    1. Wilson, William W. & Dahl, Bruce L. & Johnson, D. Demcey, 1999. "Transparency And Bidding Competition In International Wheat Trade," Agricultural Economics Reports 23403, North Dakota State University, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics.
    2. Johnson, R.W.M., 1995. "Modelling Government Processes and Policies in Agriculture: A Review," Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 63(03), December.
    3. Wilson, William W. & Diersen, Matthew A., 1999. "Competitive Bidding On Import Tenders: The Case Of Minor Oilseeds," Agricultural Economics Reports 23421, North Dakota State University, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics.
    4. Wilson, William W. & Dahl, Bruce L., 2000. "Import Tenders And Bidding Strategies In Wheat," Agricultural Economics Reports 23285, North Dakota State University, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics.

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