A Survey of Noncooperative Game Theory with Reference to Agricultural Markets: Part 2. Potential Applications in Agriculture
AbstractThis paper is the second of a two-part survey on noncooperative game theory relevant to agricultural markets. Part 1 of the survey focused on important game theory concepts, while this paper illustrates applications of the theory to agricultural markets. Game theory is relevant when markets are imperfectly competitive, and this paper argues that this condition is commonly met in agriculture. Specific topics of application include principal-agent models, auctions, and bargaining.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society in its journal Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics.
Volume (Year): 62 (1994)
Issue (Month): 02 (August)
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