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Modelling Government Processes and Policies in Agriculture: A Review

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  • Johnson, R.W.M.

Abstract

In this paper, political preference functions and bargaining models based on game theory are examined for their relevance to government processes and policies in agriculture. While bargaining models show some refinements over preference models in explaining how interest group demands are met in a modern society, the results appear to still fall short of a well-documented understanding of the political economy and institutions involved in policy decisions. In practical terms, economic modelling is too time-consuming and elaborate to inform everyday decisions of government but an understanding of the principles involved and previous results of this kind of analysis can inform the work of both policy advisors and decision makers.

Suggested Citation

  • Johnson, R.W.M., 1995. "Modelling Government Processes and Policies in Agriculture: A Review," Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 63(03), pages 1-11, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:remaae:12380
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12380
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Aparajita Goyal & John Nash, 2017. "Reaping Richer Returns [Obtenir de meilleurs résultats]," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 25996, December.
    2. Fertő, Imre, 1998. "Az agrárpolitika politikai gazdaságtana I. A kormányzati politikák modellezése a mezőgazdaságban [The political economy of agrarian politics. Part I. Modeling of governmental policies in agricultur," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 223-246.
    3. Mogues, Tewodaj, 2012. "What determines public expenditure allocations?: A review of theories, and implications for agricultural public investments," IFPRI discussion papers 1216, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

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    Keywords

    Agricultural and Food Policy;

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