Ex-vessel Pricing and IFQs: A Strategic Approach
AbstractIn this article, intraseasonal fishing is modeled as a differential game between fishers in a total allowable catch (TAC)â€“regulated fishery with and without individual fishing quotas (IFQs). Heterogeneous harvest values are included by incorporating time-specific harvest costs and a cumulative-harvest effect into fishersâ€™ profit functions. I also allow for strategic interaction among fishers via ex-vessel price dynamics. The equilibrium harvest strategies of the differential games are solved numerically through the use of a genetic algorithm. It is demonstrated how different harvesting sector environments lead to varying degrees of ex-vessel price increases when IFQs are implemented. The primary result shows that possible margins for competition among fishers, other than competition for a greater share of the TAC, can exist even under IFQ management and this competition, especially when combined with noncompetitive processors, may be substantial enough to prevent sizeable rent transfers from the processing sector to the harvesting sector.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 24 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm
Individual fishing quotas; property rights; differential games; genetic algorithm.; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Q22; C73; C61;
Other versions of this item:
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
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