Abstract This paper examines the problem of non-cooperative fishing between Mainland China (MC) and Taiwan (TW) as well as the effects of rising sea surface temperature (SST) on the grey mullet fishery. The results show that Taiwan can expand its fleets to a greater extent when facing an imperfectly elastic demand for fish than when facing a perfectly elastic demand. In addition, when consumer welfare is included in the determination of the size of fleets, fleet size can expand more than when profit is considered alone. It is also shown that the expansion of the fleets in MC and the rising SST cause the rent obtained from the TW fishery to decline, and that Taiwan may partially offset such an adverse effect by adjusting the fleet size. Keywords: Grey mullet, non-cooperative game, sea surface temperature. JEL Classification Codes: Q22, Q28, Q54.
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