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Within-Season Rents: Maximised or Dissipated in an Open-Access Fishery?

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Author Info
Kennedy, John
Hannesson, Rognvaldur
Abstract

Abstract It is pervasively argued that the equilibrium outcome for an open-access fishery in which harvesting cost is inversely related to fish stock is inefficient, with complete dissipation of within-season rents. However, some argue instead that within-season rents are maximised. Conditions under which either outcome can be justified are considered. Competitive open-access outcomes are presented for different versions of continuous-time and discrete-time models of within-season fishing. The general conclusion is that in many cases rent maximisation is the more plausible outcome. The issue is important for determining the benefits of different types of regulation under uncertainty, the optimal settings of instruments such as quotas and landing fees, and the way in which open-access outcomes should be modelled in applied work.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7955
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 21 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:ags:mareec:7955

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Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm

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Related research
Keywords: Open-access fishery; within-season rent; non-cooperative game.; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D62; Q22;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 1997. "A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource Use," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Trond Bjorndal & Jon M. Conrad, 1987. "The Dynamics of an Open Access Fishery," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 20(1), pages 74-85, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Weitzman, Martin L., 2002. "Landing Fees vs Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish Stocks," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 325-338, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Koenig, Evan F., 1984. "Controlling stock externalities in a common property fishery subject to uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 124-138, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-26.


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