This paper describes an alternative, rights-based approach to the economic problems of fisheries management and governance. The approach is based on the concept of a Virtual Population (VP), which provides an alternative way to define use rights in a fishery management system. Included is a comparison of harvest rates under the VP regime, “sole-owner,†and open-access regimes. In comparison, a VP solution is more efficient than open access and can approach that of a sole owner. More importantly, in our opinion, the approach contains a higher degree of local control over issues such as concentration of ownership and, unlike some community-based systems, provides an explicit, decentralized incentive for conservation. It also contains a built-in incentive mechanism for end-of-year conservation that is absent from individual transferable quotas (ITQs).
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