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Rent Collection, Rent Distribution, and Cost Recovery: An Analysis of Iceland’s ITQ Catch Fee Experiment

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Author Info
Matthiasson, Thorolfur

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Abstract

Resource rentals can be defined as payments made by the user of a resource to the stakeholders to whom the payment accrues. Typically, resource rentals take the form of a payment by a commercial enterprise to the state. Resource rentals can be viewed as a tax on resource rents (i.e., on net income derived from the use of a resource) or as royalties or access fees to a resource. The Icelandic Fishery Management Act requires that vessel owners pay a resource rental in the form of the “catch fee†(veidigjald), which is one of the first attempts to explicitly use resource rent generated in fisheries as a base for government revenue. This paper first discusses the legislative activity leading up to the introduction of the catch fee, followed by a discussion of how the Fishery Management Act defines the fee. Then, the effect of using a quota-lease-charge rule is discussed and finally there is an evaluation of whether the catch fee is high enough.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 23 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:ags:mareec:49178

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Related research
Keywords: Resource rentals; catch fee; ITQs; Icelandic fishery management; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Relations/Trade; D33; D63; H21; Q22; Q28;

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  1. Newell, Richard G. & Sanchirico, James N. & Kerr, Suzi, 2005. "Fishing quota markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 437-462, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Heaps, Terry & Helliwell, John F., 1985. "The taxation of natural resources," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 421-472 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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