Cooperative Solutions in a Transboundary Fishery: The Russian-Norwegian Co-Management of Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock
AbstractIn order to focus on the necessity of justifying a specific choice of cooperative solution for applied analysis, a cooperative game theoretic setting is used to describe possible solutions for the Russian-Norwegian joint management of the migratory Arcto-Norwegian cod stock. Three different cooperative solutions, as well as cooperative compensated solutions to the problem, are introduced and discussed. The cooperative solutions are compared to one another in terms of the parties' preferences, threats and maximum points, and further set into a context of compensated exchange. Based on the cooperative and compensated solutions discussed, a negotiation framework is established in which four distinct stages of decision making can be identified. Finally, the different solutions are discussed in the setting of Norway and Russia's current political and economic environment. The so called Salukvadze solution, compensated or not, can be seen to be an appropriate solution to the fisheries problem. The compensation must be paid over time to Russia.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 09 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm
cooperative/compensated fisheries management; transboundary fish stock; Norway; Russia; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;
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- Ehud Kalai, 1983. "Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 556, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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