An Economic Analysis of Highgrading in ITQ Fisheries Regulation Programs
AbstractITQ management programs can provide incentives to discard low valued fish so that individual quota can he used for relatively more valuable fish. Such "highgrading" can also occur where there are other constraints on harvest, such as hold capacity. This paper compares and contrasts the exact conditions under which highgrading will occur with ITQ and other harvest constraints. Considering all costs, highgrading can be efficient with physical constraints hut it is an unfortunate artifact of lTQs. Whether or not highgrading will occur depends upon the price differential between high and low valued fish, the cost of sorting and discarding and the cost of re-harvest. Policies for correcting or reducing ITQ highgrading should it occur, are described.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 09 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm
Fisheries Management; ITQs; highgrading; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;
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