On Catch Discarding in Fisheries

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On Catch Discarding in Fisheries

Author Info

Arnason, Ragnar

Abstract

This paper examines the economics of catch discarding in fisheries. To study this issue a simple dynamic fisheries model is constructed. On the basis of this model it is demonstrated that in a differentiated fishery discarding of catch may be socially optimal. The paper goes on to show that individual firms in a free access, competitive fishery employ the socially optimal discarding rule. In contrast, the individual transferable quota (ITQ) fisheries management regime tends to generate an excessive incentive for discarding catch. The problem, however, does not appear to derive from the ITQ .system as such. Rather, it seems to depend on the imperfect application of the system to real fisheries. The concept of a discarding function is defined and it is shown that at least within the framework of the model employed the discarding function for an ITQ fishery dominates the one for free access, competitive fisheries. Numerical examples are provided. Finally, possible remedies of the discarding problem are briefly discussed.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 09 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:ags:mareec:48888

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R. Quentin Grafton & Ragnar Arnason & Trond Bjorndal & David Campbell & Harry F. Campbell & Colin W. Clark & Robin Connor & Diane P. Dupont & Rognvaldur Hannesson & Ray Hilborn & James E. Kirkley & To, 2005. "Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries (now replaced by EEN0508)," Economics and Environment Network Working Papers 0501, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network. [Downloadable!]
Kristofferson, Dadi & Rickertsen, Kyre, 2005. "High-Grading in a Quota-Regulated Fishery, with Empirical Evidence from the Icelandic Cod Fishery," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24722, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
Abbott, Joshua K. & Wilen, James, 2006. "Strategic Joint Production Under Common-Pool Output Quotas: The Case of Fisheries Bycatch," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21468, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
Phoebe Koundouri & Trond Bjorndal & Sean Pascoe, 2004. "Output Substitution in Multi-Species Trawl Fisheries: Implications for Quota Setting," Working Papers 2004.30, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Vestergaard, Niels, 1996. "Discard Behavior, Highgrading And Regulation: The Case Of The Greenland Shrimp Fishery," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 11(4). [Downloadable!]
Matthew A. Turner, 1995. "Economics without Free-disposal: Quota-induced Discarding in Heterogenous Fisheries," Working Papers mturner-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2000. "Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case og Illegal Landings," Working Papers 9/00, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
Hoagland, Porter & Jin, Di, 1997. "A Model Of Bycatch Involving A Passive Use Stock," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 12(1). [Downloadable!]
Matthew A. Turner, 1995. "Value-based ITQ's," Working Papers mturner-95-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Turner, Matthew A., 1996. "Value-Based Itq'S," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 11(2). [Downloadable!]
Lori Bennear & Robert Stavins, 2007. "Second-best theory and the use of multiple policy instruments," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(1), pages 111-129, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn, 2007. "Bio-economies of scope and the discard problem in mulitple species fisheries," Staff General Research Papers 12839, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
R. Quentin Grafton & Harry W. Nelson & Bruce Turris, 2005. "How to Resolve the Class II Common Property Problem? The Case of British Columbia's Multi-Species Groundfish Traw," Economics and Environment Network Working Papers 0506, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network. [Downloadable!]
Matthew A. Turner, 1998. "Optimal quota programs," Working Papers mturner-98-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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