Enforcement Issues in Selecting Fisheries Management Policy
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to present a frame of reference in which to compare fisheries regulations and to identify enforcement issues that can be important in practical policy application. The issues discussed include dockside vs. at-sea monitoring; ease of government implementation; period at risk when in noncompliance; ease and cost with which industry participants can achieve ability to comply; ease of distinction between honest mistakes, sloppy practices, and deliberate cheating; initial vs. continued compliance; ease with which requirements can be communicated; ease with which noncompliance can be disguised; ease with which agents can detect noncompliance such that it is admissable as evidence; degree to which personal or social benefits from compliance can be demonstrated; potential for citizen cooperation in identifying offenders; likelihood of encouraging rentseeking behavior by industry and of administrators being susceptible to it; ease with which illegal activities can be detected under various conditions; relative ability to which enforcement is efficacious with respect to different management objectives; and ease with which benefit-based priorities for enforcement can be identified.Download Info
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Article provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 06 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages:
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Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm
Related research
Keywords: fisheries enforcement; fisheries management; fisheries rent; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;References
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Melstrom, Richard T. & Horan, Richard D., 2012. "Managing Excessive Predation in a Predator-Prey Setting: The Case of Piping Plovers," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 123350, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Seijo, Juan Carlos, 1993. "Individual Transferable Grounds in a Community Managed Artisanal Fishery," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 8(1).
- Damania, Richard & Bulte, Erwin H., 2006. "Renewable resource regulation and uncertain prices: The role of financial structure and bankruptcy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 41-53, January.
- Julio Peña, 1996. "Regulación Pesquera en Chile: Una Perspectiva Histórica," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 33(100), pages 367-395.
- Deacon, Robert T. & Finnoff, David & Tschirhart, John, 2011. "Restricted capacity and rent dissipation in a regulated open access fishery," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 366-380, May.
- Joel Kincaid, 2003. "The Determinants of Property Rights In U.S. Marine Fisheries," Law and Economics 0304004, EconWPA.
- Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2000. "Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case og Illegal Landings," Working Papers 9/00, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
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