Crop Sharing in the Fishery and Industry Equilibrium
AbstractThis article presents a model of commercial fishing in a stochastic environment that focuses on the labor-employment contract. In a partial equilibrium context, the authors show that when boat owners and crew members are risk-averse, crop sharing is the optimal contract, and the resultant labor employment level will be greater than with a (suboptimal) wage contract. Industry effects and steady-state resource growth limitations are introduced into a market equilibrium model. In this extended model, market equilibria will also involve sharing contracts. These will result in greater employment, which comes at the expense of reduced resource stocks and higher-than-necessary harvesting costs. The article also examines how industry regulation such as licensing, quotas, and subsidies will differ if the prevailing contract is cropsharing as compared with a wage. Despite the fact that cropsharing contracts are privately optimal in a regulated setting, they may not be socially optimal.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 06 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm
wage contracts; crop-sharing contracts; equilibrium; fisheries; Environmental Economics and Policy; Labor and Human Capital; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;
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Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
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- Anderson, Eric E., 1994. "Crop Sharing in the Fishery and Industry Equilibrium: Comment," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 9(1).
- Plourde, Charles & Smith, J. Barry, 1994. "Crop Sharing in the Fishery and Industry Equilibrium: Reply," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 9(1).
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- Derek Pyne, 1996. "Revealed Preference Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem," Working Papers 1997_01, York University, Department of Economics.
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