Sharing Rules and Stability in Coalition Games with Externalities
AbstractThis paper examines cooperative sharing rules in fisheries coalition games and develops a new sharing rule that takes into account the stability of cooperation when externalities are present. We contribute to existing knowledge by introducing a connection between cooperative games (sharing rules) and non-cooperative games (stability). As an illustrative example, we describe a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model of the major agents who exploit the cod stock in the Baltic Sea.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 22 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm
Baltic Sea cod; characteristic function; coalition game; cooperation; fisheries; nucleolus; Shapley value; sharing rules; stability of cooperation; Environmental Economics and Policy; C62; C70; Q22; Q28;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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