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Sharing Rules and Stability in Coalition Games with Externalities

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Author Info
Kronbak, Lone Gronbaek
Lindroos, Marko

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Abstract

This paper examines cooperative sharing rules in fisheries coalition games and develops a new sharing rule that takes into account the stability of cooperation when externalities are present. We contribute to existing knowledge by introducing a connection between cooperative games (sharing rules) and non-cooperative games (stability). As an illustrative example, we describe a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model of the major agents who exploit the cod stock in the Baltic Sea.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42448
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 22 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:ags:mareec:42448

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Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm

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Related research
Keywords: Baltic Sea cod; characteristic function; coalition game; cooperation; fisheries; nucleolus; Shapley value; sharing rules; stability of cooperation; Environmental Economics and Policy; C62; C70; Q22; Q28;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2006. "An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(3), pages 169-194, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael, 2009. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2009-10, University of Stirling, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Greenberg, Joseph, 1994. "Coalition structures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 37, pages 1305-1337 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hans-Peter Weikard, 2009. "Cartel Stability Under An Optimal Sharing Rule," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(5), pages 575-593, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Sumaila, Ussif Rashid, 1999. "A review of game-theoretic models of fishing," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-10, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Duarte, Clara Costa & Brasao, Ana & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2000. "Management Of The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application Of C-Games," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 15(1). [Downloadable!]
  7. Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lindroos, Marko & Kaitala, Veijo, 2000. "Nash Equilibria In A Coalition Game Of The Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring Fishery," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 15(4). [Downloadable!]
  9. Lone Grønbæk Kronbak, 2004. "A Coalition Game of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery," Working Papers 55/04, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Urs Steiner Brandt & Lone Grønbæk Kronbak, 2006. "Robustness of Sharing Rules under Climate Change - The Case of International Fisheries Agreements," Working Papers 73/06, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lone Grønbæk Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2008. "On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters," Working Papers 79/08, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.

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