On the Microeconomics of Quota Management in Fisheries
AbstractThis paper compares the economic incentives created by transferable and non-transferable quotas in a fishery, in particular the incentives to discard fish of certain species or grades when quotas are enforced at the landing site. With a hypothetical efficient allocation of non-transferable quotas, the incentive structure is essentially the same as under transferable quotas. However, in the absence of the information provided by the quota price, outcomes may not be the same under all conditions. Inefficient allocations of non-transferable quotas will tend to reduce discards due to highgrading but increase discards in multispecies fisheries. The impact of discarding on the quota price in a transferable quota fishery is examined.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 20 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm
fisheries management; quotas; ITQs; discards; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D21; D45; Q22;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anderson, Lee G., 1994. "An Economic Analysis of Highgrading in ITQ Fisheries Regulation Programs," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 9(3).
- Charles, Anthony T. & Mazany, R. Leigh & Cross, Melvin L., 1999. "The Economics Of Illegal Fishing: A Behavioral Model," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 14(2).
- Arnason, Ragnar, 1994. "On Catch Discarding in Fisheries," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 9(3).
- Anderson, Lee G., 1991. "A note on market power in ITQ fisheries," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 291-296, November.
- Ciaian, Pavel & Kancs, d'Artis & Swinnen, Johan F.M., 2012.
"European Union Land Markets and the Common Agricultural Policy,"
2012 Conference, August 18-24, 2012, Foz do Iguacu, Brazil
126683, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Ciaian, Pavel & Kancs, d'Artis & Swinnen, Jo & Vranken, Liesbet, 2011. "European Union land markets and the Common Agricultural Policy," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/306034, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn, 2012. "Harvest Efficiency and Discards under Harvest Uncertainty and Trading Frictions," Staff General Research Papers 35039, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Pavel Ciaian & d'Artis Kancs & Johan F.M. Swinnen, 2008.
"Static and Dynamic Distributional Effects of Decoupled Payments: Single Farm Payments in the European Union,"
LICOS Discussion Papers
20708, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
- Ciaian, Pavel & Kancs, d’Artis & Swinnen, Jo, 2012. "Income Distributional Effects of Decoupled Payments: Single Payment Scheme in the European Union," Factor Markets Working Papers 134, Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Per Sandberg, 2006. "Variable unit costs in an output-regulated industry: The Fishery," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(9), pages 1007-1018.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.