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Implications Of Taxing Quota Value In An Individual Transferable Quota Fishery

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Author Info
Johnson, Ronald N.
Abstract

Taxing pure rents is usually considered the least distortionary method for raising revenues. In the literature on fishery economics, the term "rent" is regularly employed, suggesting that pure rents exist in that sector. Indeed, with the recent development of individual transferable quotas, the resulting market value of quota has been treated as reflecting pure resource rents. In this paper, the view that the market value of quota represents a pure rent that can be readily extracted in a nondistortionary manner by the taxing authority is challenged because that argument ignores both economic incentives and political realities.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:ags:mareec:28261

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Keywords: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-22, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Slemrod, Joel, 1990. "Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 157-78, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  4. Heaps, Terry & Helliwell, John F., 1985. "The taxation of natural resources," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 421-472 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lindner, R. K. & Campbell, H. F. & Bevin, G. F., 1992. "Rent Generation During the Transition to a Managed Fishery: The Case of the New Zealand ITQ System," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 7(4). [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Frank Asche, 2001. "Fishermen's Discount Rates in ITQ Systems," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(4), pages 403-410, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gary D. Libecap & Terry L. Anderson, 2009. "The Allocation and Dissipation of Resource Rents: Implications for Fishery Reform," ICER Working Papers 13-2009, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gary D. Libecap, 2006. "The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier: Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy," NBER Working Papers 12598, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Grafton, R. Quentin, 1996. "Implications Of Taxing Quota Value In An Individual Transferable Quota Fishery: Comment," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 11(2). [Downloadable!]
  5. Asche, Frank & Aarland, Kristin, 2000. "Fishermen'S Response To Revenue Changes: The Norwegian Coastal Mackerel Fishery," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 15(1). [Downloadable!]
  6. Christy, Francis T., 1996. "The Death Rattle Of Open Access And The Advent Of Property Rights Regimes In Fisheries," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 11(4). [Downloadable!]
  7. Coglan, Louisa & Pascoe, Sean, 1999. "Separating Resource Rents From Intra-Marginal Rents In Fisheries' Economic Survey Data," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 28(2), October. [Downloadable!]
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