Nash Equilibria In A Coalition Game Of The Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring Fishery
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to study the coalition game between the potential fishing nations of Norwegian spring-spawning herring. We study a three-player cooperative game using Shapley value and nucleolus as solution concepts. We show that full cooperation between all fishing nations is not stable when the fishing fleets have a high-catchability coefficient. Further, the potential new members of the regional fisheries management organization do not have an incentive to join in this case. However, the case of lower catchability coefficient of the fleets gives opposite results, providing us with more promising expectations for cooperation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 15 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm
Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;
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