The aim of fisheries management is to avoid over-investment in fleet capacity and over-exploitation of economically exploitable fish stocks. In this paper a model is developed where a (big) share of rents created by control accrues to boat owners while costs are covered by the general public, which also gets a (small) share of the rent. The distribution of rent is governed by administrative rule which opens the possibility of profitable rent seeking. Cost of control is assumed to increase as rent per boat increases. Control outlays are assumed to be determined so as to maximize gains to the general public. It is shown that the optimal size of the fishing fleet exceeds the size that maximizes fishery rent. It is also shown that the higher the share that accrues to the general public, the closer the optimal fleet size is to the rent-maximizing fleet size.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)