Strategic Interaction in United States Fishery Management Councils
AbstractA two-stage model of interactions within Regional Fishery Management Councils was developed in which management targets were set which may deviate from levels needed to achieve management policy. The first stage modeled bargaining solutions between Council members (harvesters, conservationists, and government) for management targets, and the second stage addressed litigation of those solutions. Results indicate that bargaining power favoring one constituent group could lead to Council outcomes that deviate from management policy. This, in turn, creates incentives for the aggrieved constituent group to litigate. Tradeoffs between benefits and costs of litigation and governmental strategies to address these issues are explored.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 19 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm
fishery management; cooperative and non-cooperative games; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D73; D78;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
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