Management Of Fisheries In The Eu: A Principal-Agent Analysis
AbstractIn this paper, an EU tax on fishing effort is studied as an alternative to the system of Total Allowable Catches (TACs). The analysis is conducted under imperfect information, and the hypothesis adopted is that the EU lacks information about the costs of individual fishermen. In light of this imperfection, there are at least two reasons for considering an EU tax. First, it can be used to correct part of the market failure associated with fisheries. Second, it can be used to secure correct revelation of fishermen types in light of asymmetric information.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 16 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm
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