Employment and Remuneration Effects of IFQs in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries
AbstractThis article utilizes a census of vessels before and after implementation of catch shares in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Island (BSAI) crab fisheries to examine the short-run effects of catch shares on employment and remuneration of crew. The number of individuals employed declined proportionately to the exit of vessels following implementation. Total crew hours dedicated to fishing activities remained roughly constant, while employment in redundant pre- and post-season activities declined due to the consolidation of quota on fewer vessels. We find little evidence of substantial changes in the share contracts used to compensate fishermen. Finally, we explore a wide array of remuneration measures for crew and conclude that both seasonal and daily employment remuneration increased substantially for many crew in the post-rationalization fishery, while remuneration per unit of landings declined as a result of a combination of increased crew productivity and the necessity of paying for fishing quota in the new system.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Marine Resources Foundation in its journal Marine Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 25 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.uri.edu/cels/enre/mre/mre.htm
IFQ; rationalization; crab; Alaska; crew; remuneration; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; J24; J33; Q22; Q28;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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