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Home Rule and the Size of County Government in Pennsylvania

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  • Latzko, David A.

Abstract

The fiscal behavior of county governments in Pennsylvania is constrained by state law. Counties can adopt a home rule charter, allowing the county government to set tax rates higher than the statutory limits. Opponents argue that home rule leads to higher taxes and an expansion of county government so the legislative tax limitations are necessary to restrain its growth. This paper finds that government expenditures are, indeed, higher in those counties which have freed themselves from the tax limitations imposed by the state legislature; however, the removal of such limitations is not associated with significantly higher per capita tax levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Latzko, David A., 2008. "Home Rule and the Size of County Government in Pennsylvania," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 38(1), pages 1-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:jrapmc:132347
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.132347
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    Cited by:

    1. Koomin Kim, 2023. "How gubernatorial budgetary power and interest groups affect vertical fiscal imbalances in the US states: Focusing on fiscal centralization and decentralization," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 53-81, July.
    2. Pengju Zhang & Phuong Nguyen‐Hoang, 2023. "Home rule and municipal revenue stability: New evidence from Texas," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 38-60, March.
    3. Daniel Shoag & Cody Tuttle & Stan Veuger, 2019. "Rules Versus Home Rule—Local Government Responses to Negative Revenue Shocks," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 72(3), pages 543-574, September.
    4. Stine, William F., 2010. "Estimating the Determinants of Property Reassessment Duration: An Empirical Study of Pennsylvania Counties," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 40(2), pages 1-17.
    5. Joseph T. Campbell & Linda M. Lobao & Michael R. Betz, 2017. "Collaborative Counties: Questioning the Role of Civil Society," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 31(3), pages 228-243, August.
    6. Pengju Zhang & Phuong Nguyen‐Hoang & Na Chen, 2022. "The impact of home rule on municipal boundary and fiscal expansion: Evidence from Texas," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(5), pages 1442-1466, November.

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