Executive Compensation Patterns and Practices in Minnesota and Wisconsin Cooperatives
AbstractCooperatives face unique challenges in compensating managers because it is more difficult to link the financial interests of the manager to those of the cooperative. One way to overcome this challenge is to use performance-based bonuses. This study of cooperatives in Minnesota and Wisconsin found that such bonuses are infrequently used. Further. evidence indicates that existing bonuses tend to be linked more to the size of the cooperative (sales. assets) than to profitability. These results suggest that more attention to this critical area is warranted.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by NCERA-210 in its journal Journal of Cooperatives.
Volume (Year): 10 (1995)
Issue (Month): ()
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Postal: 342 Waters Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506
Web page: http://www.agecon.ksu.edu/accc/ncera210/JournalofCooperatives.htm
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