Effects Of Managers' Power On Capital Structure: A Study Of Italian Agricultural Cooperatives
AbstractExcessive leverage is one of the most important problems facing Italian agricultural cooperatives as the competition in the EU intensifies. An empirical study of 500 agricultural cooperatives supports the hypothesis that cooperatives characterized as having "powerful managers" have a capital structure that is significantly different from the "nonpowerful manager" cooperatives. Powerful manager cooperatives were less leveraged and had a long term strategy that focused on minimizing financial risk by increasing their equity/asset ratio. The result of this strategy is an increased probability of long term international competitiveness.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA) in its journal International Food and Agribusiness Management Review.
Volume (Year): 03 (2000)
Issue (Month): 01 ()
Other versions of this item:
- Russo, Carlo & Weatherspoon, Dave D. & Peterson, H. Christopher & Sabbatini, Massimo, 1999. "Effects Of Managers' Power On Capital Structure: A Study On Italian Agricultural Cooperatives," Staff Papers 11753, Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics.
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- Staatz, John M., 1989. "Farmer Cooperative Theory: Recent Developments," Research Reports 52017, United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Development Business and Cooperative Programs.
- Barton, David G. & Parcell, Joseph L. & Featherstone, Allen M., 1997. "Optimal Capital Structure in Centralized Agricultural Cooperatives," 1997 Annual Meeting, July 13-16, 1997, Reno\Sparks, Nevada 35809, Western Agricultural Economics Association.
- Titman, Sheridan & Wessels, Roberto, 1988. " The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, March.
- Arcas-Lario, Narciso & MartÃn-Ugedo, Juan Francisco & MÃnguez-Vera, Antonio, 2014. "Farmersâ€™ Satisfaction with Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Marketing Spanish Cooperatives: An Explanation from Agency Theory," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA), vol. 17(1).
- Rebelo, Joao & Caldas, Jose Vaz & Matulich, Scott C., 2008. "Manager Power, Member Behavior and Capital Structure: Portuguese Douro Wine Cooperatives," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 9(2), June.
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