Special and Differential Treatment in the GATT: A Pyrrhic Victory for Developing Countries
AbstractPreferential measures for developing countries implemented within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade failed to achieve their purported goal of facilitating economic development; this failure was due to their weak theoretical underpinnings and poor policy design. Not only were the demands developing countries made for discriminatory preferences largely ineffectual, their demands for preferential treatment, together with their forgoing full participation in the multilateral trading system, fundamentally reduced the obligation of developed countries to consider the interests of developing countries in future negotiation rounds. Thus the winning of preferences was rendered a pyrrhic victory for developing countries.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade in its journal Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy.
Volume (Year): 10 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Suite 820, 410 22nd Street East, Saskatoon SK, S7K 5T6
Phone: (306) 244-4800
Fax: (306) 244-7839
Web page: http://www.esteycentre.com/
More information through EDIRC
Economic development; trade liberalization; GATT; special and differential treatment; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joseph Francois & Bernard Hoekman & Miriam Manchin, 2006.
"Preference Erosion and Multilateral Trade Liberalization,"
World Bank Economic Review,
World Bank Group, vol. 20(2), pages 197-216.
- Francois, Joseph & Hoekman, Bernard & Manchin, Miriam, 2005. "Preference Erosion and Multilateral Trade Liberalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 5153, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- J. Francois & B. Hoekman & M. Manchin, 2005. "Preference Erosion and Multilateral Trade Liberalization," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-073/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Joseph Francois & B. Hoekman & M. Manchin, 2005. "Preference Erosion and Multilateral Trade Liberalization," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp87, IIIS.
- Francois, Joseph & Hoekman, Bernard & Manchin, Miriam, 2005. "Preference erosion and multilateral trade liberalization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3730, The World Bank.
- Patrick A. Messerlin, 2006. "Enlarging the Vision for Trade Policy Space: Special and Differentiated Treatment and Infant Industry Issues," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(10), pages 1395-1407, October.
- Ozden, Caglar & Reinhardt, Eric, 2005.
"The perversity of preferences: GSP and developing country trade policies, 1976-2000,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 1-21, October.
- Ozden, Caglar & Reinhardt, Eric, 2003. "The perversity of preferences : GSP and developing country trade policies, 1976 - 2000," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2955, The World Bank.
- Ahmad, Jaleel, 1985. "Prospects of trade liberalization between the developed and the developing countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 13(9), pages 1077-1086, September.
- Wilkinson, Rorden & Scott, James, 2008. "Developing country participation in the GATT: a reassessment," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(03), pages 473-510, July.
- Baldwin, R E & Murray, Tracy, 1977. "MFN Tariff Reductions and Developing Country Trade Benefits under the GSP," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 87(345), pages 30-46, March.
- André Sapir, 1981. "Trade benefits under the EEC generalized system of preferences," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8290, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1997. "Corruption and the Global Economy," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 12.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.