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Using District Magnitude to Regulate Political Party Competition

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  • Douglas W. Rae

Abstract

This is an essay about the use of districting systems to regulate electoral outcomes and the evolution of party systems. By changing the number of seats from each district, a balance can be struck between the often conflicting goals of minority representation and defractionalization. Defractionalization is the process of forming broad-based governing majorities. Special attention is given to the electoral systems of Italy, Spain, and the United States. In the case of the United States, the author recommends a proportional representation system that mixes high-magnitude districts that encourage minority representation and low-magnitude districts that promote defractionalization.

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas W. Rae, 1995. "Using District Magnitude to Regulate Political Party Competition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 65-75, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:65-75
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.65
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.9.1.65
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Loosemore, John & Hanby, Victor J., 1971. "The Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion: Some Analytic Expressions for Electoral Systems," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(4), pages 467-477, October.
    2. Gunther, Richard, 1989. "Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 835-858, September.
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    2. Colignatus, Thomas, 2017. "One woman, one vote. Though not in the USA, UK and France," MPRA Paper 82513, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Nov 2017.
    3. Paulo Pereira, 2000. "From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 69-86, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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