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The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market Access Property Rights: Implications for Global Labor and Environmental Issues

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  • Kyle Bagwell
  • Robert W. Staiger

Abstract

Can the World Trade Organization (WTO) contribute to the attainment of sound labor and environmental policies? An answer requires an understanding of WTO rules. We argue that the purpose of WTO rules is to create a negotiating forum where governments can exchange secure market access commitments. From this perspective, we argue that supporters of sound trade, labor and environmental policies can benefit from a well-functioning WTO, because facilitating trade liberalization and preventing race-to-the-bottom/regulatory-chill problems go hand in hand, and each is accomplished by maintaining secure property rights over negotiated market access commitments.

Suggested Citation

  • Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2001. "The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market Access Property Rights: Implications for Global Labor and Environmental Issues," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 69-88, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:15:y:2001:i:3:p:69-88
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.15.3.69
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F16 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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