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The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market Access Property Rights: Implications for Global Labor and Environmental Issues

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  • Kyle Bagwell
  • Robert W. Staiger

Abstract

Can the World Trade Organization (WTO) contribute to the attainment of sound labor and environmental policies? An answer requires an understanding of WTO rules. We argue that the purpose of WTO rules is to create a negotiating forum where governments can exchange secure market access commitments. From this perspective, we argue that supporters of sound trade, labor and environmental policies can benefit from a well-functioning WTO, because facilitating trade liberalization and preventing race-to-the-bottom/regulatory-chill problems go hand in hand, and each is accomplished by maintaining secure property rights over negotiated market access commitments.

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 15 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (Summer)
Pages: 69-88
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:15:y:2001:i:3:p:69-88

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  1. Bagwell, K. & Staiger, R.W., 1988. "A Theory Of Managed Trade," Working Papers e-88-39, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
  2. Feenstra, R.C., 1995. "Estimating the Effects of Trade Policy," Papers 95-10, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
  3. Josh Ederington, 2001. "International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1580-1593, December.
  4. Pinelopi K. Goldberg & Michael M. Knetter, 1996. "Goods Prices and Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned?," NBER Working Papers 5862, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Won Chang & L. Alan Winters, 2002. "How Regional Blocs Affect Excluded Countries: The Price Effects of MERCOSUR," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 889-904, September.
  6. Limao, Nuno, 2005. "Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 175-199, September.
  7. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
  8. Gros, Daniel, 1987. "A note on the optimal tariff, retaliation and the welfare loss from tariff wars in a framework with intra-industry trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 357-367, November.
  9. Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 190-214, March.
  10. Josh Ederington & Jenny Minier, 2003. "Is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier? An empirical analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(1), pages 137-154, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Sheldon, Ian M. & Josling, Timothy E., 2002. "Biotechnology Regulations And The Wto," Working Papers 14594, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
  2. Philip I. Levy, 2003. "Non-Tariff Barriers as a Test of Political Economy Theories," Working Papers 852, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
  3. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "National Sovereignty in an Interdependent World," NBER Working Papers 10249, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Fischer, Carolyn & Hoffmann, Sandra & Yoshino , Yutaka, 2002. "Multilateral Trade Agreements and Market-Based Environmental Policies," Discussion Papers dp-02-28, Resources For the Future.
  5. Thilo Glebe & Uwe Latacz-Lohmann, 2007. "Agricultural multifunctionality and trade liberalisation," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 82, pages 57-73.
  6. Laixun Zhao, 2006. "International Labor Standards and Southern Competition," Discussion Paper Series 193, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  7. Daniel Millimet & Rusty Tchernis, 2006. "On the Specification of Propensity Scores: with an Application to the WTO-Environment Debate," Caepr Working Papers 2006-013, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  8. Andrei A. Levchenko, 2004. "Institutional Quality and International Trade," IMF Working Papers 04/231, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Simon Teitel, 2001. "Globalization and its disconnects," ICER Working Papers 07-2002, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  10. Steve Mccorriston & Ian Sheldon, 2005. "Export Competition and the Remission of Domestic Environmental Taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(5), pages 627-637, September.
  11. McCorriston, Steve & Sheldon, Ian M., 2003. "Export Competition And The Remission Of Domestic Environmental Taxes," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 21994, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  12. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, 2006. "Reciprocity and the hidden constitution of world trade," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 133-163, September.
  13. Drusilla K. Brown & Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M Stern, 2002. "Pros and Cons of Linking Trade and Labor Standards," Working Papers 477, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  14. Thilo W. Glebe, 2005. "Welfare Economics of Trade Liberalisation and Strategic Environmental Policy," Discussion Papers 072005, Technische Universität München, Environmental Economics and Agricultural Policy Group, revised 2008.
  15. Thilo W. Glebe, 2005. "Do positive agricultural externalities provide a justification against trade liberalisation?," Discussion Papers 062005, Technische Universität München, Environmental Economics and Agricultural Policy Group.
  16. McCorriston, Steve & Sheldon, Ian M., 2002. "The Non-Neutrality Of Wto Border Tax Adjustments For Environmental Excise Taxes Under Imperfect Competition," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19673, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).

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