Classroom Games: A Market for Lemons
AbstractThe incentives that arise in markets with asymmetric information are illustrated in the classroom exercise presented here. Student sellers choose both a quality 'grade' and a price for their products. Initially, both prices and grades for all sellers are posted, and buyers select from these offerings. In this full-information setup, the market prices and grades quickly reach efficient levels that maximize total surplus. Next, although sellers continue to choose grades and prices, only prices (not grades) are posted for buyers to see when they shop. The grades and prices then fall to inefficiently low levels. The observed market outcomes in this exercise can stimulate useful discussion of asymmetric information, market failure, and remedies such as quality standards and warranties.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Volume (Year): 13 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (Winter)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Charles A. Holt, 1996. "Classroom Games: Trading in a Pit Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 193-203, Winter.
- Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
- Tsao, Hsiu-Yuan & Pitt, Leyland F. & Berthon, Pierre, 2006. "An experimental study of brand signal quality of products in an asymmetric information environment," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 397-405, August.
- Capra, C. Monica & Goeree, Jacob K. & Gomez, Rosario & Holt, Charles A., 2000. "Predation, asymmetric information and strategic behavior in the classroom: an experimental approach to the teaching of industrial organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 205-225, January.
- Michelle Sovinsky Goeree & Jeroen Hinloopen, 2005. "Cooperation in the Classroom: Experimenting with Research Joint Ventures," General Economics and Teaching 0503005, EconWPA.
- Michelle Sovinsky Goeree & Jeroen Hinloopen, 2006. "Cooperation in the Classroom: Experimenting with R&D Cooperatives," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-081/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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